



**California  
EMF  
Program**

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# **POLICY OPTIONS IN THE FACE OF POSSIBLE RISK FROM POWER FREQUENCY ELECTRIC AND MAGNETIC FIELDS (EMF)**



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## Policy Options in the Face of Possible Risk from Power Frequency Electric and Magnetic Fields (EMF)

### ABSTRACT

1 In 1993, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) mandated that the  
2 Department of Health Services (DHS) oversee a program of research and  
3 policy analysis about power frequency EMFs (see [www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)).  
4 In addition to projects on EMF exposures in schools and the workplace, and  
5 a study on EMFs and miscarriage, the program supported two policy  
6 analyses. They dealt respectively with possible EMF information campaigns  
7 and avoidance measures, on the power grid and in schools.

8 A stakeholder's advisory group oversaw the EMF Program. In overseeing the  
9 policy analysis it became clear that stakeholders operate under four different  
10 policy frameworks that lead to differences in preferred action with regard to  
11 involuntary environmental exposures. Economists and regulators adhere to  
12 a "utilitarian" framework that aims at "the most good for the most people at  
13 the least cost." Many citizens adhere to a "social justice" framework that  
14 aims at "protecting the most vulnerable regardless of cost." Others adhere  
15 to a "virtual-certainty-required" framework that requires certainty of a  
16 problem before acting on it. Still others adhere to a "non-interventionist"  
17 framework that prefers voluntary non-governmental approaches to  
18 environmental risk regardless of the degree of confidence that there is a  
19 problem.

20 To assist economists and regulators who frame policy in terms of costs and  
21 benefits the policy analysts asked, "how confident must one be that EMFs  
22 cause disease and how much disease must be caused before one could  
23 justify implementing cheap or expensive EMF information campaign and/or  
24 avoidance measures?" The results suggest that a range of expenditures,  
25 from inexpensive to expensive, could be justified from a cost-benefit  
26 perspective even without 100% confidence that EMFs cause disease.  
27 Depending on the avoidance measures taken this could increase 1999 utility  
28 rates between 0.2% to 3.5% for a decade and could cost \$0.48 to \$7.6 billion.  
29 Information campaigns would be much less expensive. Judging by other  
30 protective measures taken, economists have determined that society seems  
31 willing to pay around \$5 million per statistical death avoided. To make these  
32 investments costs beneficial, economists would require avoiding between

33 100 and 1,500 deaths over the 35-year useful life of the modified power lines  
34 statewide. (The DHS contractor acknowledges uncertainty in costs and the  
35 means of financing projects; thus these numbers could be higher by a factor  
36 of 2.)

37 School EMF interventions could cost \$40-\$50 million statewide. Therefore to  
38 make this investment cost beneficial, economists would require avoiding ten  
39 deaths among the five million students and half a million staff over the  
40 assumed 35-year useful life of the modified schools statewide.

41 For those who use a "social justice" policy framework that aims at protecting  
42 the vulnerable regardless of cost, the analyses discuss issues of interest to  
43 that perspective. For those who use a "virtual-certainty-required" framework  
44 that requires certainty of an EMF effect to take any action, the analyses and  
45 the risk evaluation (see below) provides them with the information they need  
46 to take a position. Adherents to the "non-interventionist" framework will find  
47 discussions of voluntary or informational strategies that could be taken.

48 Adherents to the "utilitarian," "social justice," and "virtual-certainty-  
49 required" policy frameworks will probably advocate different courses of  
50 action on the basis of these assessments and analyses. The CPUC has  
51 administrative procedures to resolve such differences with regard to power  
52 grid policy. They can use the information that the California EMF Program  
53 has gathered with regard to the power grid in any such deliberations. The  
54 state agencies and local districts concerned with educational facilities can  
55 use the policy analysis and exposure information in any policy activities that  
56 they pursue. DHS will not be making any recommendations on policy at this  
57 point in the process.

### THE CALIFORNIA EMF PROGRAM

58 In 1993, the CPUC directed investor-owned utilities to provide funds for policy  
59 relevant research and public education. Municipal utilities also contributed to this  
60 \$7 million program. The resulting California EMF Program was fiscally  
61 implemented by the nonprofit Public Health Institute (PHI) and directed by DHS. At  
62 the request of the CPUC, a stakeholder's group including concerned citizens, the  
63 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, utilities, and various public interest  
64 groups advised DHS on the research topics to pursue and provided detailed  
65 comments on two policy projects. These and other projects supported by the EMF  
66 Program are described on the project website ([www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)).

1 Stakeholders asked DHS to carry out a risk evaluation in a way that would be  
2 helpful for forming policy in the face of uncertainty. A Science Advisory Panel of  
3 scientists without conflict of interest or particular biases about the EMF issue  
4 provided external criticism of the Risk Evaluation.

5 At the same time, in 1993, the CPUC directed investor-owned utilities to follow a  
6 "no and low cost" EMF avoidance policy in constructing new transmission and  
7 distribution lines, allowing them to charge rate payers for up to 4% of the total  
8 project cost for avoiding EMFs. They also directed the utilities to provide yearly  
9 updates on EMF research in one monthly bill per year and to provide free EMF  
10 measurements to their customers.

#### FOUR POLICY FRAMEWORKS LEAD TO DIFFERENT COURSES OF ACTION UNDER UNCERTAINTY

11 Members of the scientific community are far from unanimous in their degree of  
12 confidence that EMFs influence the risk of various diseases. Making policy in the  
13 face of uncertainty is characteristic of many public health issues. Examples include  
14 global warming, mad-cow disease, and irradiated foods. In the course of designing  
15 and critiquing the Program's school and power grid policy projects, it became clear  
16 that stakeholders have different policy frameworks that they use in approaching  
17 such problems involving voluntary and involuntary exposures. It also became clear  
18 that many arguments about policy choices are really arguments about frameworks.  
19 Economists, engineers, and regulatory agencies often use a predominantly results-  
20 oriented "utilitarian" framework. Any given stakeholder using this framework  
21 considers his/her options along a number of criteria and chooses the option that  
22 produces the best trade-offs between the various criteria. In order to find the option  
23 with the best balance of criteria, the utilitarian stakeholder may assign dollar values  
24 to tangible criteria such as project costs and even to criteria such as aesthetic  
25 consequences or quality-adjusted years of human lives saved. When stakeholders  
26 using this approach end up advocating different courses of action because they  
27 have different interests, the utilitarian resolves the conflict by choosing the solution  
28 that aims at producing the "most good for the most people at the least cost."  
29 Sometimes this ignores the interests of some small segment of society. On many  
30 issues, members of the general public do not adhere to the utilitarian framework.  
31 Often they adhere either to a "social justice" framework that tries to fulfill duties or  
32 protect rights of the vulnerable regardless of cost, a "non-interference" framework  
33 that tries to protect individual and property rights from governmental interference,  
34 or a framework that requires virtual certainty of a problem before taking action.  
35 Adherents to these frameworks might prefer different policy options. For example,

36 suppose a municipality that owned its own electrical utility decided that it was  
37 probable that magnetic fields from power lines and appliances were hazardous and  
38 wanted to do something about it. The utilitarians in town might recommend that the  
39 municipal utility should pay for the most cost-effective measures to reduce  
40 exposure, even if not deriving from the sources for which they were responsible.  
41 For example, they could buy up enough old, high-exposure electric blankets and  
42 replace them with new, low-exposure models, to prevent as much disease that  
43 might be caused by the power grid. The adherents to the social justice framework  
44 might point out that the minority of people living next to the power grid were still at  
45 unequal risk. They might invoke a strong form of the "precautionary principle" that  
46 expensive avoidance policies are warranted on the basis of a few credible  
47 scientists suspecting a small risk that violates the rights of even a small group of  
48 people. They might say that following the precepts of environmental justice, there  
49 was a special duty to protect this group if it had been unfairly singled out for EMF  
50 exposure on the basis of previous exposures to other hazards, low-income levels,  
51 less access to medical care, or racial inequalities. From this perspective  
52 environmental agents like EMFs should be treated as "guilty until proven innocent."  
53 Therefore, this framework would propose that the people living near the power  
54 lines should be protected by modifying the lines to lower fields even if it were more  
55 expensive to do so. They might also invoke a duty of the utilities "to clean up their  
56 own mess" at the utility's expense. The adherents to "non-interference" might  
57 oppose both options because they involved involuntarily taxing the many for the  
58 benefit of the few. Regardless of the degree of confidence in the existence of an  
59 EMF hazard, they might prefer a "right to know" information program to allow the  
60 free market and voluntary actions of those who were concerned to solve the  
61 problem. Adherents to the "virtual-certainty-required" framework would not want to  
62 take any action unless all scientists in the field were totally convinced of a problem.  
63 For these adherents, EMFs are "innocent until proven guilty." There is no technical  
64 resolution to these kinds of arguments. A democracy handles them through the  
65 political process.

66 Policy contractors to the California EMF Program were instructed to use an  
67 approach that would be useful to adherents of all frameworks and to highlight  
68 issues where the different policy frameworks might clash so that decision-makers  
69 could be helped to anticipate how features of different policy options might be  
70 attractive to stakeholders who adhered predominantly to one or the other policy  
71 frameworks. The "social justice," "non-interference," and "virtual-certainty required"  
72 frameworks are governed by fairly straightforward prescriptive principles and do  
73 not require extensive presentations. Their arguments are easier for most  
74 stakeholders to grasp. The results-oriented "utilitarian" analysis, by its nature,

1 requires extensive discussion of the potential consequences and costs of each  
2 option under consideration. Because of this, to be responsive to the utilitarian  
3 stakeholders and regulators, the bulk of the analyses are utilitarian and may be  
4 difficult for many stakeholders to follow. It is not the role of DHS at this point in the  
5 process to advocate for any one of these four policy frameworks, although DHS  
6 has meaningfully involved all stakeholders from the very beginning of the California  
7 EMF Program. This is of particular concern to the social justice/environmental  
8 justice frameworks

9 In forming policy about the ubiquitous exposures from electricity, policymakers  
10 need to decide ahead of time if they will be considering issues of cost and if they  
11 would take action based on any degree of confidence about an EMF hazard less  
12 than 100%. For those who ignore costs or only act if there is virtual certainty of a  
13 hazard, substantial parts of the policy projects supported by the California EMF  
14 Program will not be helpful. For those who do consider these issues, the policy  
15 analysis should be helpful.

16 The decision analysis approaches used in the policy projects accommodates the  
17 non-utilitarian policy frameworks to the extent that they allow stakeholders to keep  
18 track of and take account of who pays for avoidance and who receives the unusual  
19 exposures. It also deals explicitly with uncertainties.

## 20 THE ECONOMISTS APPROACH TO THE VALUE OF PUBLIC HEALTH ACTION

21 Asking about the dollar value of a statistical life, as economists do, only makes  
22 sense from the utilitarian policy framework, which is willing to put dollar values on  
23 various criteria like human lives. Since many important stakeholders use this  
24 framework we address it head on, although stakeholders who use the social justice  
25 framework would feel uncomfortable even asking the question and stakeholders  
26 using the virtual-certainty-required framework would be uncomfortable being asked  
27 to pay even for inexpensive measures that are warranted by degrees of confidence  
28 short of 100%.

29 The program's policy contractors reviewed the economic (utilitarian) literature that  
30 compares various medical, public health, and environmental policies and their  
31 efficacy to infer what economists think that society is willing to pay to avoid a  
32 statistical death. This varies from program to program, ranging from \$1 million to  
33 \$10 million per death avoided.

34 As a rough indicator of the health benefit that would be needed by the utilitarian  
35 framework to justify the cost of various avoidance measures, economists would

36 divide the unit project cost (e.g., the per mile cost of undergrounding a 69 kV line)  
37 by say, \$5 million per death avoided. This derives the deaths that an economist  
38 would require to be avoided per mile to make the unit project cost "cost-beneficial."  
39 We present the "unfinanced" base case project cost numbers of our policy  
40 contractors. The reports themselves discuss stakeholder arguments about these  
41 and other factual matters. (The figures could easily be higher by a factor of 2.) We  
42 also present the statewide project costs both as whole numbers and, for the power  
43 grid discussion, as fractions of the statewide utility revenues prior to the 2000/2001  
44 California energy crisis.

45 In the detailed analyses of the policy projects, the total life cycle costs were  
46 considered, including maintenance costs, relative reliability, power losses due to  
47 resistance, property value impacts, etc. With the exception of property values,  
48 which are discussed later, the general conclusions of the complicated analyses are  
49 similar to those presented below considering only the capital costs. Some  
50 economists would suggest that the stream of deaths over time that might occur  
51 from EMF exposure be discounted to reflect the fact that some would do more to  
52 avoid an imminent death than they would to avoid a death 35 years in the future.  
53 To make the calculations transparent and because some oppose discounting  
54 statistical deaths, we have presented (the smaller) undiscounted numbers. These  
55 issues are discussed in the reports themselves.

56 A conscientious utilitarian would ask if there were an even more cost-beneficial  
57 use to which scarce resources could be put. For example, if moneys spent on  
58 rephasing or undergrounding transmission lines were spent on anti-smoking  
59 education, could more benefit be obtained from the same moneys? The policy  
60 analysis contractors point out that there are "decision domains" across which  
61 money cannot flow. The CPUC is unlikely to authorize the investor-owned utilities  
62 to spend ratepayer money on smoker education, so that question is not realistic. It  
63 would be legitimate to ask if the utilities would provide more health benefit by  
64 spending money to generate electricity with less sulfur and nitrates for acid rain,  
65 less CO<sub>2</sub> for global warming or less mercury for environmental contamination. If  
66 these were indeed more cost-beneficial, and the utilities were committed to devote  
67 redirected EMF resources to them, then one might restrict oneself to cost  
68 beneficial activities such as the current "no and low cost avoidance in new  
69 projects" and information activities, all of which have a lower total cost, and  
70 therefore divert less money from other life-saving activities within the decision  
71 domain of the CPUC. The California EMF Program is unable to answer the  
72 utilitarian framework questions comparing EMF avoidance with other possible  
73 health promoting policies of the utilities since comparable cost-benefit analyses of  
74 these other issues have not been done. In any case, the non-utilitarian policy

1 frameworks might use different principles to judge the relative usefulness of EMF  
2 avoidance versus avoiding these other problems.

3 The numbers presented below allow the reader to determine the number of people  
4 "exposed" in the state and whether or not the avoidance measures require an  
5 implausibly large health benefit to warrant their adoption under the economist's  
6 utilitarian cost/benefit framework.

## 7 THE POWER GRID

8 Transmission lines are the high-voltage, high-current lines that run (usually on  
9 metal towers) from generators to substations and from substation to substation.  
10 There are about 1,700 "corridor" miles of 69 kV to 230 kV transmission lines that  
11 run through California residential areas with about 1.5 million people living within  
12 500 feet on either side of these lines and 510,000 individuals living close enough to  
13 these lines to be substantially exposed to their magnetic fields (time weighted  
14 average {TWA} greater than 2 mG). A milliGauss (mG) is a unit of magnetic field  
15 exposure. A typical residence would convey an average exposure between 0.5 and  
16 1 mG.

17 The inexpensive measures for retrofit lowering of fields that are sometimes  
18 possible on the different voltage transmission lines (reverse phasing, optimum  
19 phasing, and split phasing) are varied, but costs average out to about \$80,000 a  
20 mile. By dividing \$80,000 per mile cost by \$5 million per death avoided gives 0.016  
21 deaths per mile over the 35-year lifetime of a transmission line (or 27 deaths  
22 {undiscounted} along all 1,700 miles). If this "inexpensive" measure (\$136 million  
23 total) could avoid these deaths, economists would say that it would pay for itself.  
24 The impact on utility rates for a decade would be a fraction of a percent.

25 The expensive measure for lowering fields from transmission lines is to  
26 underground the lines and heavily insulate them and place them close together so  
27 that the magnetic fields cancel. Placement this close is not feasible in aboveground  
28 lines. The cost calculations for undergrounding are shown in Table 1.

29 There are 160,000 miles of aboveground primary distribution lines in California  
30 leading (usually on wooden poles) from substations to customers. About 4% are  
31 estimated to be in residential areas and to also produce fields of the sort in the  
32 "high" category of epidemiological studies. Thus some 6,700 miles of distribution  
33 lines are possible candidates for retrofitting on the basis of EMF exposure. Our  
34 contractor estimates that 1 million individuals live close enough to these lines to be  
35 substantially exposed by their magnetic fields (TWA greater than 2 mG).

36 The inexpensive but quite efficacious means of canceling magnetic fields that is  
37 sometimes possible with distribution lines is achieved by arranging the wires in a  
38 "compact delta" configuration. The results of the calculations for these are also  
39 shown in Table 1.

40 For distribution lines, the expensive measure is to underground them and configure  
41 the circuits so that the magnetic fields cancel. See Table 1 for the calculations for  
42 this measure.

43 Phasing, configuring, or undergrounding new transmission or distribution lines are  
44 less expensive than retrofitting existing lines. The detailed policy analyses address  
45 these options separately.

46 Perhaps 5% of people live in homes with substantially elevated magnetic fields  
47 from neutral current returning to the grid along plumbing rather than the neutral  
48 wire. This is calculated to affect 550,00 homes and 1.65 million people to the  
49 extent that fields in those homes average above 2 mG.

50 The measure recommended for lowering this exposure is to insert a non-  
51 conductive (usually plastic) segment of pipe to force the current back to the neutral  
52 wire. This might cost \$200 to \$500 per home. See Table 1 for the calculations.

53 The EMF exposures to the public from generating stations and substations would  
54 be negligible except for the transmission and distribution lines that enter and leave  
55 them. These other sources have been described above.

56 As can be seen in Table 1, about 1.51 million Californians receive average EMF  
57 residential exposures greater than 2 mG from the power grid and another 1.65  
58 million receive such exposures within their homes from the way neutral currents  
59 return to the grid via plumbing instead of the neutral lines. Since there are overlaps  
60 between these sources the total exposed is less than the sum of these numbers.  
61 Except for selected occupational groups, residential exposures account for most of  
62 the daily exposures because most people spend so much time at home during a  
63 given 24-hour day. The moderate cost measures of rephasing transmission lines,  
64 compacting distribution lines, and modifying plumbing would cost about \$0.48  
65 billion statewide, increasing utility rates for a decade by less than 1%. One would  
66 need to avoid about 96 (undiscounted) deaths statewide over a 35-year period to  
67 make these measures seem most beneficial to an economist. The expensive  
68 measure of undergrounding residential area transmission lines and the  
69 undergrounding of distribution lines that produce high EMF exposures along with  
70 the modest cost of altering plumbing in houses with neutral return problems would

- 1 cost about \$7.6 billion and would raise utility rates by about 3.5% for a decade.  
 2 One would need to avoid about 1,500 (undiscounted) deaths over 35 years to  
 3 make this measure seem cost beneficial to an economist.

**TABLE 1. RESIDENTIAL EMF SOURCES, THE COSTS OF MODERATE AND EXPENSIVE MITIGATION, AND THE REQUIRED DEATHS TO AVOID TO SEEM COST BENEFICIAL FOR ECONOMISTS**

EMF SOURCE AND MITIGATION	RESIDENTIAL POPULATION "AFFECTED" TWA>2 MG	AMOUNT <sup>‡</sup>	MODEST COST MEASURES (REPHASING AND COMPACTING LINES)				EXPENSIVE MEASURES ( UNDERGROUNDING)			
			UNIT COST	TOTAL COST	% OF 10 YEAR REVENUE	STATEWIDE DEATHS TO AVOID IN 35 YEARS TO JUSTIFY COSTS <sup>1</sup>	UNIT COST	TOTAL COST	% OF 10 YEAR REVENUE	STATEWIDE DEATHS TO AVOID IN 35 YEARS TO JUSTIFY COSTS <sup>1</sup>
TRANSMISSION	510,000	1,700 miles	\$80,000 per mile	\$136 million	0.06 %	27	\$1.46 million per mile	\$2.48 billion	1.13 %	495
DISTRIBUTION	1 million	6,700 miles	\$35,000 per mile	\$234.5 million	0.11%	47	\$750,000 per mile	\$5.03 billion	2.3 %	1,005
GROUNDING	1.65 million	550,000 homes	\$200 per home	\$110 million	0.05%	22	\$200 per home	\$110 million	0.05 %	22
<b>TOTAL</b>	2.59 million*			\$480.5 million	0.22 %	96		\$7.61 billion	3.46 %	1,522

<sup>‡</sup> The miles of line represent the contractor’s best estimate. California utilities explained that a special study would be required to provide exact circuit and corridor miles in residential areas.

<sup>1</sup> By dividing total cost by \$5 million per death avoided, a utilitarian would derive the number of avoided deaths required to make a measure cost beneficial

\* The total number of exposed people is smaller than the sum of people affected by each source, because of an overlap between sources.

Source: von Winterfeldt, D. Power Grid Project. [www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf).

Restricting avoidance measures to new transmission or distribution lines would cost less money overall, have less impact on utility rates, and would divert less money from other activities, while having similar cost effectiveness. It would leave the majority of people involuntarily exposed to the power grid without a program directed at them. Information programs respond to the social justice framework's "right to know," but have uncertain cost effectiveness. A program that cost \$500,000 a year would need to save one life statewide every decade to make itself cost beneficial.

## SCHOOLS

Table 2 shows similar calculations for the four sources (net currents, electrical panels, distribution lines, transmission lines) that account for 80% of the exposures in California schools according to a survey of 89 randomly selected schools carried out for the California EMF Program. The most common source is the misconnecting of neutral conductors in sub-panels and junction boxes.

This leads to a condition called "net currents." This wiring practice is contrary to the electrical code and can increase the probability of fires. It also produces magnetic fields. It is not very expensive to change, but many schools have at least one classroom affected. Proximity to electrical panels is a rare source that requires dealing with expensive shielding. Distribution lines and transmission lines are much less frequent sources of exposure next to schools and can be dealt with as described above. The program's contractors estimate that the total cost of a statewide program to deal with these four sources in order to eliminate fields above 2 mG would be around \$43 million. Some stakeholders argue that one should deduct the \$16 million for net currents from the total cost since that should be dealt with to conform with the electrical code in any case. A big element of statewide cost would be the systematic survey of EMF exposure in all 8,000 schools to detect unusual sources. (The row totals are not always the sum of the numbers in the cells because not all schools have all sources.)

The economist would require the avoidance of 9 deaths among the 5 million students and among the half a million teachers and staff over a 35-year period to make the \$43 million measures cost beneficial.

The bulk of EMF exposure expressed as "milliGauss-hours" is below 2 mG. Hence, the measures in Table 2 aimed at eliminating exposures above 2 mG only eliminate

a fraction of the exposure. There is some epidemiological evidence that risk only begins to accrue above 3-4 mG.

**TABLE 2. COSTS OF MEETING A 2-MG STANDARD FOR THE SPATIALLY-AVERAGED MAGNETIC FIELD IN CLASSROOMS. COSTS ARE BEST ESTIMATES, BASED ON UNIT COST ESTIMATES AND EXPOSURE DATA IN ZAFFANELLA AND HOOPER 2000. ACTUAL COSTS MAY DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THESE ESTIMATES.**

	SOURCE				
	NET CURRENTS ONLY	ELECTRICAL PANELS ONLY	DISTRIBUTION LINES ONLY	TRANSMISSION LINES ONLY	ALL FOUR
<b>COST PER AFFECTED SCHOOL</b>	\$5,300	\$37,000	\$30,000	\$65,000	\$13,000
<b>NUMBER OF AFFECTED SCHOOLS</b>	~ 3,000	~ 300	~ 300	~ 200	~3,500
<b>STATEWIDE TOTAL COSTS</b>	\$16 million	\$12 million	\$9 million	\$13 million	\$43 million
<b>STATEWIDE DEATHS TO AVOID TO BE COST BENEFICIAL AT \$5 MILLION /DEATH</b>	3.2	2.4	1.8	2.6	9
<b>STATEWIDE COSTS, NOT INCLUDING SURVEY</b>	\$8 million	\$4 million	\$8.3 million	\$12.8 million	\$33 million
<b>STATEWIDE SURVEY COSTS</b>	\$8 million	\$8 million	\$0.7 million	\$0.2 million	\$10 million
<b>FRACTION OF STATEWIDE SCHOOL-TIME EMF EXPOSURE ELIMINATED</b>	20%	1%	4%	3%	29%

Source: Florig, K. School Policy Project. [www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)

### DETAILED DECISION ANALYSIS INSIGHTS

1 Stakeholders pointed out to the policy analysts that direct project construction costs  
 2 and potential health benefits were not the only criteria by which to compare the  
 3 status quo to the inexpensive options and the expensive options. Particularly with  
 4 regard to the all important power grid, stakeholders argued about how the several  
 5 options would impact reliability, loss of power due to resistance, and property  
 6 values. It also became clear that the way any changes were financed (pay as you  
 7 go vs. borrow and pay interest) was important. Another 20 considerations, including  
 8 tree-cover, avoided pole collisions, impact on air pollution, and electrical fires, were  
 9 considered but turned out to involve far less costs than the above- listed items. Thus  
 10 considering these items did not affect the ranking of options. A report and computer  
 11 models were prepared for distribution lines and various voltage classes of  
 12 transmission lines, as well as for changing the grounding system to avoid ground

13 currents. These models allowed consultants for the various stakeholders to  
 14 challenge assumptions made and satisfy themselves that the insights gained were  
 15 valid. A similar approach was used for the School Policy Analysis.

16 One contentious issue related to the impact of EMF fears on the value of properties  
 17 near power lines. Concerned citizen stakeholders argued that EMF fears had  
 18 already impacted property values and that undergrounding lines would restore  
 19 adjacent properties to their original values. They argued further that a fairly small  
 20 property revaluation would cancel out undergrounding costs. For example, if there  
 21 were one hundred \$300,000 homes adjacent to a one-mile-long transmission line  
 22 they would argue that a 10% revaluation would yield \$3 million for undergrounding.  
 23 The policy analyst contractors pointed out that people buy and sell houses  
 24 frequently in California so that undergrounding a power line might restore original  
 25 value to some owners who had bought prior to the initiation of EMF fears in the



1 1980s, but would constitute a windfall for those who might have bought cheaply  
2 after the fears began. Furthermore, unless the power line neighbors managed to  
3 spread the cost of property losses to all rate payers, the fact that they received  
4 restitutions or windfalls would not affect the burden on utility rates for the rest of the  
5 rate payers. Counting property values losses due to EMF fears would also set a  
6 precedent for other environmental agents of potential but uncertain risks. Also, not  
7 all power line neighbors own their dwellings, thus issues of environmental justice  
8 come into play. Finally, a special subproject of the power grid policy analysis  
9 suggested that it would be very costly and extremely difficult to provide solid  
10 evidence as to the amount of property impact due to EMFs as opposed to aesthetic  
11 considerations. This will be an important policy issue for the CPUC.

12 The reader should refer to the summaries and full reports of the actual projects for  
13 the full set of conclusions ([www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)). In general, both the power  
14 grid and the school policy analyses concluded that there were inexpensive to  
15 moderately expensive measures that could be justified on a cost-benefit basis if  
16 there were a moderate degree of confidence that childhood leukemia alone was  
17 affected by EMFs. Expensive measures would not be justified even by a 100%  
18 degree of confidence of a quite strong effect on this disease alone, although a  
19 moderate degree of confidence that EMFs contributed to the cause of several  
20 diseases would warrant expensive measures.

21 Both policy analyses examined the option of setting standards for areas near power  
22 lines and in schools. This is a more demanding approach than simply doing the best  
23 one can by requiring the use of available technology to lower fields to the degree  
24 possible. The rationale for setting a particular number requires confidence that the  
25 relevant metric is known and that a safe level can be defined. With ionizing  
26 radiation where no threshold of effect is assumed, some "de minimis" risk level is  
27 chosen, usually a level of exposure corresponding to a 1/ million or 1/100 thousand  
28 risk. For other agents with thresholds of effect some safety factors ranging from 10  
29 to 1000 fold have been used. Using that approach, if x milliGauss was the lowest  
30 level at which one shows signs of a health effect, the standard would be set at  
31 x/1000 milliGauss. Any of these approaches would lead to requiring levels far below  
32 background levels in homes far from power lines. The pros and cons of standards  
33 are discussed in each of the policy analyses.

34 Three scientists were assigned by DHS to review the EMF literature, a  
35 physician/epidemiologist, a geneticist/epidemiologist, and a physicist with training in  
36 epidemiology. They were assisted by ten other DHS scientists. The reader can see  
37 from the Risk Evaluation ([www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)) that, prior to considering the  
38 specific evidence about EMFs, the scientists started with a low degree of confidence

39 that every day exposures to EMFs would cause disease. After reviewing the EMF  
40 evidence this degree of confidence increased. To one degree or another all three of  
41 the DHS scientists leaned toward the belief that EMFs can cause some amount of  
42 increased risk of childhood leukemia, adult brain cancer, Lou Gehrig's Disease, and  
43 miscarriage. On the other hand, they strongly believed that EMFs do not increase  
44 the risk of birth defects or low birth weight, and strongly believed that EMFs are not  
45 "universal carcinogens" since not all the cancer types studied were associated with  
46 EMFs. To one degree or another they leaned away from believing that EMFs cause  
47 an increased risk of heart disease, Alzheimer's Disease, Depression, or symptoms  
48 attributed by some to sensitivity to EMFs. All three scientists had judgments that  
49 were close to being evenly divided between the belief that EMFs do or do not cause  
50 some degree of increased risk of suicide. For adult leukemia two of the scientists  
51 were close to the dividing line between believing or not believing and one was prone  
52 to believe that EMFs caused some degree of increased risk. While there are  
53 important differences between the three DHS reviewers' conclusions, the DHS  
54 scientists are more inclined to believe that EMF exposure increased the risk of the  
55 above health problems than were the majority of the members of scientific  
56 committees convened by the National Institutes of Environmental Health working  
57 group (NIEHS) in 1998, by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)  
58 in 2001, and by the British National Radiation Protection Board (NRPB) in 2001 to  
59 evaluate the scientific literature. These other committees all assessed EMFs as a  
60 "possible" carcinogen for childhood leukemia. Thus, like the DHS panel, these other  
61 three panels were not much swayed by theoretical arguments of physicists that  
62 residential EMFs were so weak as to make any biological effect impossible. NIEHS  
63 additionally assessed EMFs as a possible carcinogen for adult lymphoid leukemia  
64 and NRPB assessed a possible link with Lou Gehrig's Disease. The three DHS  
65 scientists differed in that they had a somewhat higher degree of belief that EMF is  
66 linked with these three diseases and gave credence to evidence of a link to adult  
67 brain cancer and miscarriage that the other panels either didn't consider or  
68 characterized as "inadequate." There are several reasons for these differences. The  
69 three DHS scientists thought there were reasons why animal and test tube  
70 experiments might have failed to pick up a mechanism or a health problem; hence,  
71 the absence of much support from such animal and test tube studies did not reduce  
72 their confidence much or lead them to strongly distrust epidemiological evidence  
73 from statistical studies in human populations.

74 Since even the lowest risks detectable by epidemiologists imply lifetime risks greater  
75 than 1 per 100,000, even the associations with the rarest diseases could be of  
76 regulatory interest if real. Nonetheless, the absolute individual risks of EMF  
77 exposure would be such that the vast majority of highly exposed people would not  
78 contract these diseases. Even if only a few percent of the background California

1 deaths from conditions that received some degree of credibility from the DHS  
2 scientists (childhood leukemia {3,465 background deaths/35 years}, adult brain  
3 cancer {45,290 background deaths/35year}, Lou Gehrig's disease {15,190  
4 background deaths/35 years}) this could be sufficient to exceed the 98 deaths over  
5 35 years needed to make modest changes to the power grid cost beneficial over a  
6 35 year period. The same could be said for the 9 deaths over 35 years that would  
7 be required to make changes in schools cost beneficial.

8 A variety of electrical phenomena are present in the vicinity of power lines, in-home  
9 wiring, plumbing, and appliances. These include electric and magnetic fields with a  
10 variety of frequencies and orientations, stray currents from contact with grounded  
11 plumbing, and air pollution particles charged by electric fields. The epidemiological  
12 studies primarily implicate the magnetic fields or something closely correlated with  
13 them. Some researchers think that associated high or low frequency stray contact  
14 currents or charged air pollution particles are the true explanation rather than  
15 magnetic fields. The actions one would take to eliminate the fields are not always  
16 the same as one would take to eliminate the currents or the charged particles. There  
17 are some situations where different costly measures would be required to address  
18 the above-mentioned three possible explanations. There are other situations where  
19 one or more inexpensive avoidance actions will address all three. This additional  
20 uncertainty about what aspect of the mixture might need to be mitigated will thus  
21 provide a challenge for policymakers. The California EMF Program funded policy  
22 projects to explore various options that could be pursued in the face of these  
23 uncertainties (see [www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)). These are available to guide the  
24 CPUC and other state agencies in policy formation.

## 25 OTHER POLICY IMPLICATIONS

26 The DHS is not making recommendations at this point in the process. The  
27 interested public should be referred to the power grid and school policy analysis  
28 projects, which deal with various topics. These include inexpensive or expensive  
29 avoidance measures on the power grid and in schools and the cost effectiveness of  
30 further research. The program also funded a study on the feasibility of identifying  
31 tasks such as using power tools that were likely to convey EMF exposure. This  
32 project is of potential usefulness to those concerned about occupational policy, such  
33 as the California Department of Industrial Relations.

34 The policy projects do not deal with all the issues that might be of interest to the  
35 public. Some of these include:

- 36 ?? Continuing or not continuing the CPUC policy of no- and low-cost  
37 avoidance in new projects, providing yearly information notices on EMFs  
38 in electricity bills and free EMF measurements for customers
- 39 ?? Whether or not to permit leasing rights of way-under transmission lines, to  
40 permit the siting of playgrounds and jogging paths near transmission lines,  
41 to allow the changing of amperage on existing transmission towers, or  
42 requiring the logging of currents on transmission lines to facilitate further  
43 study
- 44 ?? Whether or not to train and certify those who might test schools for EMFs  
45 or do electrical contracting work there
- 46 ?? Options for other types of buildings, such as office buildings, hospitals ,  
47 daycare centers, nursing homes, factories
- 48 ?? Options and public information about EMFs in electrical rail transit and  
49 electrical or hybrid automobiles
- 50 ?? Options for electrical and other occupations
- 51 ?? Options for providing education and technical assistance to government  
52 agencies and the public
- 53 ?? Options for the design of appliances or for building codes
- 54 ?? Options for EMF avoidance in occupational settings
- 55 ?? The role (if any) of conservation and of solar and wind power and  
56 "distributed generation" in reducing the amount of electricity used and the  
57 distance it must travel
- 58 ?? The oversight, organization and funding of any further research, as well as  
59 topics for further policy relevant research (if any) such as studies of the  
60 relative reliability of above-ground and below-ground power lines, the  
61 occurrence of electrocutions along the power grid, and further studies of  
62 common health conditions possibly associated with EMFs
- 63 ?? Options for implementing any actions so that they are or are not sensitive  
64 to fairness and issues of environmental justice

1 From the utilitarian cost-benefit perspective, the degree of confidence about  
2 causality for the various diseases considered would suggest that a number of  
3 inexpensive and moderate cost measures could be justified for adoption.

4 On the basis of the Risk Evaluation, adherents to the various policy frameworks may  
5 advocate different courses of action. Adherents to the social justice framework may  
6 well advocate more expensive or wide-reaching measures. Adherents to the virtual-  
7 certainty-required framework may advocate no action at this time, while adherents  
8 of the non-interference framework may advocate informational approaches only.

9 The CPUC has administrative procedures for reconciling conflicting interests and  
10 perspectives with regard to the power grid. This is particularly important in the face  
11 of the need in California for more capacity in generation and transmission of  
12 electricity. State and local agencies develop policy for schools. Since electricity is so  
13 ubiquitous many agencies have potential interest in this issue.

#### **RISK COMMUNICATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER EMF DECISIONS**

14 The Program paid for a detailed analysis related to the power grid and to public  
15 schools, but electricity is everywhere and central to society in developed countries.  
16 By taking any action with regard to the power grid and or schools, policymakers  
17 would send a message about the need to make changes in the design of  
18 appliances, commercial and public buildings, electrical transportation, and  
19 workplace standards. While the Risk Assessment shows that the vast majority of  
20 individuals would not be affected by EMFs, there could well be anxiety generated by  
21 mandated avoidance action in the school, power grid, and home grounding sectors.  
22 Anxiety itself has health consequences. There is also the possibility of tort lawsuits  
23 in the various sectors where electricity is used and EMF exposure occurs. These  
24 legitimate concerns are raised when any new environmental regulation is proposed.  
25 For example, there were major concerns raised about such issues when Proposition  
26 65 was adopted in the mid-1980s requiring the labeling of products that contained  
27 recognized carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Now, more than a decade later,  
28 many of the original fears about the regulation are seen to have been exaggerated.  
29 Experience has shown that people tend to take a "better safe than sorry" approach  
30 to even very small risks, if there is no benefit to them personally and the exposure is  
31 involuntary. However, people will often tolerate risks and not be anxious if there is  
32 cost to them in removing the exposure or if there is a benefit from tolerating it.  
33 Therefore, it will be important to provide information to the public and to develop  
34 stakeholder agreement on how to proceed with regard to EMF exposures.