

## 21.0 CONCLUSIONS

### 21.1 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

1 Having examined and discussed each of the health endpoints mentioned above in a  
2 separate chapter in the main document, the three DHS reviewers each assigned  
3 their best judgment IARC classification and degree of certainty (as a number  
4 between 0 and 100). These determinations are summarized in Table 21.1. Column  
5 1 displays the condition considered. Column 2 identifies the reviewer. Column 3  
6 shows the IARC classification in which the number "1" denotes a definite hazard:  
7 "2a" a probable hazard, "2b" a possible hazard, and "3" evidence "inadequate" to  
8 make a classification. Column 4 displays the pre-agreed-upon phrases for  
9 describing zones of certainty. Column 5 shows the ratio of the reviewers imputed  
10 posterior odds to the reviewers imputed prior odds (more about this below). In  
11 column 6, the reviewers graphed their best-judgment degree of certainty as an "x"  
12 and indicated their uncertainty with a shaded bar on either side of that best  
13 judgment.

14 To provide an illustration, a method has been applied to two non-EMF examples in  
15 the first two rows. In row 1, Reviewer 2 has indicated that air pollution is a definite  
16 causal trigger of asthma attacks and that he is virtually certain of this. In row 2 he  
17 shows that he strongly believes that particulate air pollution causes excess deaths.  
18 There is relatively little uncertainty around either of these determinations.

19 Row 3 displays the prior degree of certainty that there would be epidemiologically  
20 detectable effects when comparing disease rates among persons exposed to EMFs  
21 at or above the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of US residential levels to rates at or below the 1<sup>st</sup>  
22 percentile residential exposure. These prior degrees of certainty range from 5 to 12  
23 on a scale from 0 to 100.












24 Column 5 is labeled "IRL" for "imputed relative likelihood." If the degree of certainty  
25 is converted to a probability scale (0–1.0) and, in turn, if one converted the  
26 probability to odds (probability/1–probability) the imputed prior odds can be  
27 compared to analogously calculated imputed posterior odds. One would base these  
28 on the "best judgment" posterior degrees of certainty graphed in Table 21.1. The  
29 resulting "imputed relative likelihoods" provide some indication of how much the  
30 overall pattern of evidence in biophysics, mechanistic, animal pathology, and  
31 epidemiological streams of evidence have combined to move the reviewers from  
32 their respective starting degrees of certainty. For example, with regard to air

33 pollution triggering asthma attacks, the existing evidence has caused Reviewer 2 to  
34 move 900-fold from his prior, while the childhood leukemia evidence has moved him  
35 22-fold\*. Royall (Royall, 1997) has suggested anchoring the interpretation of such  
36 relative likelihood numbers on the relative likelihoods derived by probability theory  
37 from the following hypothetical experiment: Suppose that a reviewer has two urns,  
38 one that contains only white balls, the other that contains half white balls and half  
39 black balls. He takes one of the two urns at random. To determine which urn he has  
40 ended up with, he begins repeatedly withdrawing a ball and then replacing it in the  
41 urn (after noting down its color) and mixing up the balls before pulling out yet  
42 another ball. If on only one draw he were to find a black ball, he would know that he  
43 was dealing with the urn containing 50% black balls. But what is the relatively  
44 likelihood conveyed by drawing one or more consecutive white balls? Royall  
45 demonstrates that drawing 5 white balls in a row conveys a relative likelihood of 32,  
46 while drawing 10 consecutive balls conveys a relative likelihood of 1,024. Reviewer  
47 2 views the asthma/air pollution data as being almost as strong as the evidence  
48 conveyed by drawing 10 consecutive white balls during the urn experiment, while  
49 the childhood leukemia evidence is equivalent to drawing just shy of 5 consecutive  
50 white balls.

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\* Reviewer 2 had a prior of 0.05 and a posterior for childhood leukemia of 54. The prior odds are  $0.05/0.95 = 0.0526$ . The posterior odds are  $0.54/0.46 = 1.174$ . The imputed relative likelihood is  $1.174/0.0526 = 22.3$ .

TABLE 21.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ON ALL THE END POINTS CONSIDERED

CONDITION	REVIEWER	IARC CLASS	CERTAINTY PHRASE	IRL	DEGREE OF CERTAINTY FOR POLICY ANALYSIS THAT AN AGENT (EMFs) INCREASES DISEASE RISK TO SOME DEGREE
Air Pollution Triggered Asthma Attacks (Example: Not EMF-Related)	2	Human Risk	Virtually certain	931	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Particulate Air Pollution Triggered Deaths (Example: Not EMF-Related)	2	Prob. Risk	Strongly believe	171	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Prior Confidence that EMFs Could Cause Epidemiologically-Detectable Disease	1		Prone not to believe	1	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2		Strongly believe not	1	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	3		Strongly believe not	1	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Childhood Leukemia	1	1	Strongly believe	140	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	2B	Close to dividing line	22	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	3	2A	Prone to believe	17	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
Adult Leukemia	1	1	Prone to believe	29	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	2B	Close to dividing line	21	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	3	2B	Close to dividing line	6	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 

CONDITION	REVIEWER	IARC CLASS	CERTAINTY PHRASE	IRL	DEGREE OF CERTAINTY FOR POLICY ANALYSIS THAT AN AGENT (EMFs) INCREASES DISEASE RISK TO SOME DEGREE
Adult Brain Cancer	1	2B	Prone to believe	29	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	2B	Close to dividing line	20	
	3	2B	Close to dividing line	13	
Childhood Brain Cancer	1	3	Close to dividing line		0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Prone not to believe		
	3	3	Prone not to believe		
Breast Cancer, Female	1	3	Close to dividing line	7	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Prone not to believe	3	
	3	3	Prone not to believe	2	
Breast Cancer, Male	1	3	Close to dividing line	6	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Prone not to believe	12	
	3	3	Prone not to believe	2	
EMF Universal Carcinogen?	1	3	Strongly believe not	0.4	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Strongly believe not	0.5	
	3	3	Strongly believe not	0.2	

CONDITION	REVIEWER	IARC CLASS	CERTAINTY PHRASE	IRL	DEGREE OF CERTAINTY FOR POLICY ANALYSIS THAT AN AGENT (EMFs) INCREASES DISEASE RISK TO SOME DEGREE
Miscarriage	1	2B	Close to dividing line	9	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	2B	Close to dividing line	20	
	3	2B	Close to dividing line	11	
Other Reproductive	1	3	Strongly believe not	0.4	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Strongly believe not	0.8	
	3	3	Strongly believe not	0.2	
ALS (Lou Gehrig's Disease)	1	2B	Close to dividing line	9	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	2B	Close to dividing line	21	
	3	2B	Close to dividing line	11	
Alzheimer's	1	3	Close to dividing line	5	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Prone not to believe	4	
	3	3	Prone not to believe	2	
Suicide	1	3	Close to dividing line	6	0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
	2	3	Close to dividing line	15	
	3	3	Close to dividing line	7	

CONDITION	REVIEWER	IARC CLASS	CERTAINTY PHRASE	IRL	DEGREE OF CERTAINTY FOR POLICY ANALYSIS THAT AN AGENT (EMFs) INCREASES DISEASE RISK TO SOME DEGREE																				
					0	5	10	15	20	25	30	35	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100
Heart Disease	1	3	Close to dividing line	6																					
	2	3	Prone not to believe	8																					
	3	3	Prone not to believe	3																					

**21.2 HOW DIFFERENT IS THIS EVALUATION FROM THE NIEHS, NRPB AND IARC FINDINGS?**

- 1 As outlined in Table 21.2 below, there are both common points and significant
- 2 differences between the EMF Program's evaluation and those carried out at about

- 3 the same time by the NIEHS Working Group for the Federal EMF-RAPID Program
- 4 (Portier & Wolfe, 1998), (IARC, 2001), and the NRPB (NRPB, 2001a), (NRPB,
- 5 2001b) (Note: The NRPB did not use the IARC classification system but expressed
- 6 their conclusion using common language expressions).

7 The following table compares these evaluations:

**TABLE 21.2 A COMPARISON OF DHS REVIEWERS' DEGREE OF CERTAINTY WITH THAT OF OTHER AGENCIES**

HEALTH OUTCOME	NIEHS WORKING GROUP	IARC	NRPB	DHS
Childhood leukemia	2B*	2B	Possible	2B to 1
Adult leukemia	2B (lymphocytic)	Inadequate	Inadequate	2B to 1
Adult brain cancer	Inadequate	Inadequate	Inadequate	2B
Miscarriage	Inadequate	Not Considered	Not considered	2B
ALS	Inadequate	Not Considered	Possible but perhaps due to shocks	2B
Childhood brain cancer, breast cancers, other reproductive, Alzheimer's, suicide, sudden cardiac death, sensitivity	Inadequate	Inadequate or Not Considered	No for Parkinson's disease, inadequate for Alzheimer's, other endpoints not yet considered	Inadequate

\* Although the majority of scientists assembled to prepare the NIEHS Working Group Report voted for a "possible 2B" classification for these cancers, the lay person's summary submitted by the Director of NIEHS to Congress stated: "ELF-EMF exposure cannot be recognized as entirely safe because of weak scientific evidence that exposure may pose a leukemia hazard." (Final Report NIH Publication 99-4493, May 1999)

1 It is clear from Table 21.2 that, when applying the IARC guidelines, the DHS  
2 reviewers agreed with IARC and NIEHS reviewers that in many cases (e.g.,  
3 childhood brain cancer and male and female breast cancer), the evidence would be  
4 classified by IARC as inadequate to reach a conclusion. One of the DHS reviewers  
5 agreed with the IARC and NIEHS on childhood leukemia. Two of the reviewers  
6 agree with NIEHS, but not with IARC, on adult leukemia. All three reviewers agreed  
7 with NRPB that EMF was a "possible" cause of ALS. Otherwise, the DHS reviewers  
8 regard the EMFs association more likely to be causal than NRPB, IARC, or NIEHS  
9 did.

10 It should be noted that all of the review panels thought that the childhood leukemia  
11 epidemiology warranted the classification of EMF as a "possible" carcinogen and  
12 thus did not agree with the biophysical arguments that EMF physiological effects  
13 (and therefore pathological effects) were "impossible."

14 There is a wide range of opinions in the scientific community as to the probability  
15 that EMFs cause health problems. The DHS reviewers provided numerical values  
16 for their degrees of confidence that risk of various diseases could be increased to  
17 some degree by EMF exposure. Other researchers have rarely packaged their  
18 judgments in this way, so it is hard to make comparisons. Judging by one such  
19 exercise that the DHS reviewers conducted (Neutra, 2001), reasonable scientists  
20 can have different ways of interpreting the data resulting in different degrees of  
21 certainty.

22 The three DHS reviewers have been active in the EMF field for more than a decade  
23 and are familiar with the opinions and arguments used by the scientists in scientific  
24 meetings. Since Reviewer 1 was part of the IARC-EMF review panel and all three  
25 reviewers had some participation in the earlier parts of the NIEHS process, they  
26 also have some understanding of the process by which selected panels of these  
27 individuals arrived at a group determination about EMFs. The reviewers think there  
28 are at least two relevant differences between their process and the usual  
29 procedures followed by the other groups.

30 First, the DHS Guidelines require that they consider the inherent tendency of the  
31 several streams of evidence to either miss a true effect, or falsely "indict" a putative  
32 causal agent. The weight given to those streams of evidence was influenced by this  
33 consideration. The standard guidelines involve discussions of whether the  
34 adjectives "limited" or "sufficient" best fit the pattern observed in a stream of  
35 evidence, and depending on the decision one makes, simple guidelines of how  
36 combinations of "limited" and "sufficient" streams of evidence influence whether a  
37 "possible," "probable," or "definite" causal status is assigned. While the DHS

38 Guidelines allow null results of animal pathology studies using one ingredient of a  
39 mixture to get little weight, the IARC rules involve a simple combination of binary  
40 judgments about the animal and epidemiological evidence. The way the DHS  
41 reviewers used the Guidelines meant that they did not let the primarily null results  
42 from the mechanistic and animal pathology streams of evidence decrease their  
43 certainty as much as seems to be the case for reviewers in other panels. The  
44 reasons for this have been explained above. Having been less deterred by the null  
45 mechanistic and animal pathology, they were also less prone to invoke unspecified  
46 confounders and bias as an explanation for the persistent, if not homogeneous,  
47 epidemiological findings for certain health endpoints.

48 The other reason for the discrepancies in the DHS reviewers' IARC classification  
49 choices can be traced to differences in the procedures for combining the scientists'  
50 judgments. They found several striking differences between the IARC and this  
51 evaluation processes:

- 52 • The Panel's Composition. The EMF Program's review was carried out by  
53 the EMF Program's scientific staff and not by a large panel of experts  
54 outside the agency. An outside panel, however, evaluated the document.  
55 One could criticize the DHS panel as being too small and not diverse  
56 enough, but this is standard procedure for California government  
57 agencies. The IARC followed its usual practice of convening outside  
58 experts to write drafts, discuss the drafts, and turn these over to staff to  
59 finalize. Given the spread of the scientific opinions on the EMF issue, it is  
60 safe to say that the outcome of any review is a strong function of the  
61 working group members' belief before the review takes place. (The DHS  
62 reviewers have striven to make this transparent through the elicitation of  
63 the prior beliefs and the "pro and con" discussion.) Two unbiased ways to  
64 assemble a working group would be by random selection out of a pool of  
65 "qualified" individuals or through a conscious effort to include balanced  
66 numbers of individuals known to have opposite points of view. In the first  
67 case, the definition of "qualified" could influence the verdict of any sample,  
68 and sampling variability could yield a mix of opinions that would vary from  
69 sample to sample so that different working groups could reach different  
70 conclusions. The second procedure could be an excellent solution, if the  
71 evaluation were carried out through extensive debates and discussions,  
72 with a shared desire to come to a consensus opinion irrespective of its  
73 potential social and economic consequences. This was the original  
74 approach used by IARC (Tomatis, private communication). However, the  
75 pressure to conclude the evaluation within a short period of time led to

1 abandoning the discussion format in favor of the voting system. This leads  
2 to the next important difference.

- 3 • The Time Element: The meeting to draft the IARC-EMF monograph (June  
4 2001) lasted five-and-a-half days. The vast majority of the plenary session  
5 time was dedicated to reviewing the draft chapters prepared ahead of time  
6 by designated committee members with maybe 10% of the time allowed  
7 for discussion of the rationale for reaching conclusions. Whenever a  
8 paragraph precipitated a controversial discussion, a common way out was  
9 to propose the deletion of the offending paragraph, a proposal that the  
10 time-pressured working group members were usually glad to adopt. In  
11 contrast to this process, the DHS reviewers spent innumerable hours and  
12 days, over a period of years and in consultation with independent  
13 consultants, to explain their inferences and resolve or clarify their  
14 differences.
- 15 • The Format of the Conclusion: IARC aims for a consensus conclusion.  
16 Members with more extreme views are strongly encouraged to converge  
17 on a middle of the road conclusion. In the California evaluation, if  
18 consensus could not be reached (as was the case for some endpoints),  
19 each member was allowed to express his or her personal belief. Although  
20 two of the DHS reviewers were subordinate to the third, substantial  
21 differences remained for some endpoints and are openly revealed in this  
22 evaluation.
- 23 • IARC's Voting System: The members of the working group were asked to  
24 vote separately on animal and human evidence. Although a sizable  
25 minority of the working group believed that there was limited animal  
26 evidence indicating a possible cancer risk, their opinion was not carried  
27 past that point of the process. Since the majority regarded the animal  
28 evidence as "inadequate," when the final vote on the overall evaluation  
29 was taken, the options posed to the working group's members were the  
30 majority positions, that is, that animal evidence was inadequate and  
31 epidemiological evidence for childhood leukemia was limited. According to  
32 the guidelines, these two majority positions resulted automatically in a  
33 Group 2B classification and Class 2A or Class 1 were not even  
34 considered as options to vote on, even if individual reviewers, such as  
35 Reviewer 1, might have so voted. The published monograph does not  
36 document that the minority view had in fact a higher degree of certainty of  
37 the EMF risk than the majority view.

38 Somewhat similar considerations apply to the NIEHS evaluation. Although the whole  
39 process lasted eighteen months, the decision was reached over the course of a

40 week-long meeting, followed by a vote. This meeting was preceded by a series of  
41 workshops including discussions and presentations, but not all members of the  
42 working group participated in the workshops, and most of the workshop participants  
43 were not members of the working group. Therefore, the final conclusion was still the  
44 result of a few days intensive meeting, during which much of the time was devoted  
45 to revising and finalizing the wording of the final report rather than to writing about  
46 points of controversy. The working group report did document the vote count.

47 Apart from procedural differences, there are also philosophical differences between  
48 the various review panels. For example, with regard to adult leukemia, the IARC's  
49 evaluation differs from the NIEHS and the California evaluation because of the way  
50 epidemiological evidence was considered. Almost all the evidence on adult  
51 leukemia comes from occupational studies. The Epidemiology subgroup at the IARC  
52 meeting regarded most of these studies as being of poor quality, with within- and  
53 between-study inconsistencies. Most of the evaluation centered on the most recent  
54 large studies (Sahl et al., 1993), (Savitz & Loomis, 1995), and (Theriault et al.,  
55 1994), which contradicted each other. The DHS reviewers' evaluation considered  
56 the whole body of studies, residential and occupational. While they acknowledge  
57 that many of the studies have limitations, neither they, nor the IARC reviewers, have  
58 identified fatal flaws. For example, there is no evidence to suggest that the use of  
59 crude exposure assessment surrogates, while virtually certain to influence the  
60 quantitative estimate of risk and to frustrate any attempt to explore the dose-  
61 response relationship, introduced an upward bias in the reported association. On  
62 the contrary, the limitations of the studies may well be responsible for the  
63 inconsistencies between them. And while these inconsistencies do exist, they are  
64 not as common as the IARC evaluation may suggest. The Kheifets (Kheifets, 1997)  
65 meta-analysis concludes that the body of epidemiological evidence shows a slight  
66 but statistically significant increase in risk. From a binary outcome standpoint, the  
67 studies with an RR estimate >1 are more than twice as numerous as those with an  
68 RR # 1.

69 Nonetheless, where the DHS and other reviewer panels agreed to assign a  
70 "possible" carcinogen label to an EMF/disease association, it is not easy to infer if  
71 there would be agreement on a degree of certainty. According to Dr. Rice, Chief of  
72 IARC's Carcinogen Identification and Evaluation Unit (personal communication to  
73 DelPizzo), "If IARC were to say that an exposure is in Group 2A, probably  
74 carcinogenic to humans, that would mean that the evidence is just a little short of  
75 certainty that the exposure in question has actually caused human cancer . . . Group  
76 2B is the lowest level of identifiable carcinogenic hazard in the IARC system."

1 Finally, it must be remembered that in DHS's EMF Program, policy  
2 recommendations were addressed separately from the risk evaluation. In some  
3 other cases evaluations are part and parcel of a policy recommendation (they may  
4 include regulatory recommendations in the conclusion). This may make them more  
5 conservative, as it seems to be the case with IARC:" ... the IARC Monographs  
6 system of carcinogenic hazard evaluations is deliberately a very conservative one.  
7 There are many carcinogenic hazards in the human environment that are very real  
8 indeed, and control of exposures to those hazards is extremely important for public  
9 health. To accomplish this, it is necessary that carcinogenic hazards be correctly  
10 identified. We must avoid misdirecting public attention to any exposure of any kind  
11 that may be perceived as a hazard, but in fact is a misplaced concern." (Dr. Jerry  
12 Rice in a letter to Vincent DelPizzo, Aug 10, 2001.) The cover letter to the NIEHS  
13 report to congress concluded with a recommendation for only "passive regulatory  
14 action" (NIEHS, 1999). The DHS three reviewers have packaged their differing  
15 degrees of confidence about causality in a way that can be used in the decision  
16 analytic models prepared for the program. It has pointed out that the policy  
17 implications of this range of confidences depends on the policy framework of the  
18 decision maker: non-interventionist, utilitarian, virtual-certainty-required, or social  
19 justice. The public regulatory process will determine which one or which mixture of  
20 these frameworks will apply to govern policy. Thus the DHS risk evaluation is  
21 packaged to facilitate decision making but separates risk assessment from risk  
22 management. The fact that a reviewer may feel very certain that EMF is a risk factor  
23 for a particular disease does not imply that he or she advocates exposure mitigation.

24 In summary, the differences between the DHS reviewers' judgments and those of  
25 other reviewers are partly due to differences in procedure and terminology and  
26 partly due to the way those three reviewers weighed the several streams of  
27 evidence.

**21.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DHS REVIEWERS**

28 As noted above, the three DHS reviewers were not able to reach a consensus on all  
29 health endpoints. In this section, they explain the reasons behind their respective  
30 judgments.

**21.3.1 REVIEWER 1 (DELPIZZO)**

31 In almost all cases, Reviewer 1's posterior degree of certainty is higher than that of  
32 the other two reviewers. There are several reasons for this difference.

33 c) Different priors—the reviewer is generally more suspicious of man-made  
34 environmental pollutants, which have no place in the evolution process.

35 d) Reliance on the sign test—this reviewer has put much weight in the sign test, a  
36 simple, dichotomous test, which measures the probability of several studies  
37 erroneously reporting the existence of a risk while no risk truly exists. In many  
38 cases the test finds that this probability is extremely small, that is, the results  
39 are **unlikely** to be erroneous. In the reviewer's opinion, this test is particularly  
40 suitable to answer the simple question, is there a risk or not? rather than  
41 asking what the relative risk is. The results of this test are not changed if the  
42 outcome of one or more studies are **partly** due to bias. Some worst-case  
43 scenarios, assuming extraordinary coincidences of chance and bias acting  
44 simultaneously in the same direction, do weaken the evidence, but when a  
45 condition has been studied by many different investigators, these scenarios do  
46 not reduce Reviewer 1's belief by much.

47 c) Weight given to empirical results—Reviewer 1's prior was limited by the  
48 intuitive belief that the energy associated with environmental EMFs is so small  
49 that, even if these fields are potentially disruptive, the amount of disruption is  
50 insufficient to cause a biological effect. Once Reviewer 1 examined the results  
51 of *in vivo* and *in vitro* research on EMF exposure, however, he became  
52 convinced that biological EFFECTS (as distinct from PATHOLOGY) can result  
53 from exposure to levels below those which conventional knowledge considers  
54 necessary. That is, if one equates "energy" to "dose," exposure to  
55 environmental fields may be regarded as a non-negligible dose. Thus, the  
56 argument that kept Reviewer 1's prior low disappears and the possibility of a  
57 hazard, when repeatedly reported by independent epidemiological studies,  
58 becomes more credible.

**21.3.2 REVIEWER 2 (NEUTRA)**

59 The fact that EMFs are the only agent that this reviewer has encountered for which  
60 there are theoretical arguments that no physiological, much less pathological, effect  
61 could be possible, did decrease Reviewer 2's prior somewhat. But physics applied  
62 to simplified models of biology were not convincing enough to make this prior  
63 credibility vanishingly small. This reviewer noted biological effects in mechanistic  
64 experiments in the thousands of mG but accepted the arguments that these were  
65 probably not relevant to effects below 100 mG. The few experiments that claimed to  
66 show an effect below 100 mG (the chicken embryo studies and the confirmatory  
67 studies of Liburdy's melatonin studies) were considered highly worthy of further  
68 study, but not robust enough or free enough of alternative explanations at this point



1 to cancel out the modest initial doubts about the energetic feasibility of residential  
2 EMFs to produce biological effects. The animal pathology studies have convinced  
3 Reviewer 2 that very high intensity pure 60 Hz or 50 Hz sinusoidal magnetic fields  
4 do not have a strong enough effect to produce consistent pathological effects in  
5 small numbers of the species and strains of animals selected for study. If these  
6 species of animals were to respond as humans are described to have done in the  
7 epidemiology, this was a predictable result even if pure sinusoidal 60 Hz fields were  
8 the active ingredient of the EMF mixture. Humans exposed to hundreds of mG,  
9 when compared to persons with 24-hour average exposures around 1 mG like  
10 electric train engineers, do not show relative risks consistently above 1.00, much  
11 less very high relative risks. Why would animals be expected to do so? Moreover,  
12 pure sinusoidal fields may not be a bioactive ingredient of the mixture, and the  
13 animal species chosen may not be appropriate models for humans. Reviewer 2  
14 believes that the animal bioassay stream of evidence in this case is thus triply  
15 vulnerable to missing a true effect, and the null results do not reduce his confidence  
16 in an EMF effect much. The fact that there are epidemiological associations with  
17 several different cancer types and with other diseases that have different known risk  
18 factors does increase confidence somewhat but, without mechanistic reasons, not a  
19 great deal. Any changes from the prior were due to epidemiological evidence.  
20 Large studies likely to be free of selection bias carried a lot of weight. Many studies  
21 of different design and in different locations showing similar results also carried  
22 substantial weight, although Reviewer 2 only interpreted the sign test to indicate  
23 whether a meta-analytic or pooled association came from just a few large studies, or  
24 from a rather consistent pattern of result from many studies. Reviewer 2 did not  
25 think that any of the specific candidate confounders or biases that had been  
26 proposed to date for explaining away the epidemiology had convincing evidence to  
27 support it. The fact that most of the associations are not much above the resolving  
28 power of epidemiological studies left open the possibility of unspecified  
29 combinations of bias, confounding, and chance having produced these associations.  
30 This kept Reviewer 2 from having an updated degree of certainty above the  
31 certainty zone of "close to the dividing line between believing and not believing" that  
32 EMFs increase the risk to some degree.

### 21.3.3 REVIEWER 3 (LEE)

33 Reviewer 3 mainly used the human epidemiological evidence to form a posterior  
34 degree of certainty. The large number of studies showing consistent results across  
35 different study designs, study populations, and exposure assessments, as well as  
36 large, well-conducted studies with adequate power to address confounding, bias,  
37 dose response, and effects among subgroups contributed strongly in updating the

38 prior degree of certainty. The association of EMFs with several types of disease and  
39 experimental and animal evidence were minor contributions to the updating process.  
40 Specificity, visibility, analogy, and, in general, temporality did not contribute much to  
41 the posterior degree of certainty.

### 21.4 HOW THE DEGREES OF CONFIDENCE AND RANGE OF UNCERTAINTY COULD BE USED IN POLICY ANALYSES

42 Community and stakeholder policy decisions usually are made from one or more of  
43 the following ethical perspectives: "non-interference," which emphasizes individual  
44 choice and rights free from the infringement of others and of government; "social  
45 justice," which emphasizes the protection of the weak, and rights and duties;  
46 "virtual-certainty-required," where protective action is only taken when the vast  
47 majority of scientists are virtually certain that there is a problem; and the "utilitarian  
48 perspective," which emphasizes results and the most good for the most people at  
49 the least cost. Each perspective would have somewhat different requirements for  
50 the degree of certainty of causality before initiating action.

51 The "non-interference" perspective seeks to avoid regulatory impingement and  
52 taxes and tends to favor "right-to-know" warnings and voluntary solutions to  
53 problems, regardless of the degree of certainty. The "virtual-certainty-required"  
54 framework would tend to require a high degree of certainty with narrow uncertainty  
55 bounds on the part of most scientists and a high probability of harm from exposure  
56 before acting on an environmental hazard. Indeed, this perspective would favor risk-  
57 assessment methods having few false positives, even at the cost of false negatives.

58 The "social justice" perspective seeks to avoid even the possibility of risk,  
59 particularly if the risk and the benefit are imposed on different parties. This  
60 perspective would tend to advocate protective action at lower degrees of  
61 confidence, wider uncertainties, and lower absolute probabilities of harm given  
62 exposure. It would favor risk-assessment approaches with few false negatives, even  
63 in the face of false positives. It would focus on the added lifetime risk to the most  
64 highly exposed.

65 The "utilitarian cost/benefit" perspective would evaluate the policy implications of the  
66 best estimate of the degree of certainty but would explore the consequences of the  
67 lower and upper bounds of the confidence that a hazard exists. It would focus on the  
68 burden of societal disease that could be avoided by EMF mitigation. Depending on  
69 the relative prevalence of stakeholders who suffer, respectively, from false positives  
70 and false negatives, the utilitarian perspective would develop a preference for risk-  
71 assessment methodologies. The reviewers would propose that the policy integration

1 document discuss the implications for policy arising from the range of best-  
2 estimates among the three reviewers and the range of uncertainties expressed. It  
3 should also discuss where the three DHS reviewers' degrees of confidence lie in the  
4 spectrum of scientific opinion.

### 21.5 EVIDENCE OF RISK RELEVANT FOR POLICYMAKERS MINDFUL OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ISSUES

5 It is sometimes alleged that lower SES subjects are more likely to live in areas with  
6 stronger environmental EMFs. Salzberg et al. (Salzberg et al., 1992) first explored  
7 this hypothesis and found only weak support for it. Bracken et al. (Bracken et al.,  
8 1998) reported a strong correlation between some SES indicators (women's  
9 occupations, house values) and the very high-current configuration (VHCC) wire  
10 code configuration. Two very large data sets collected in the San Francisco Bay  
11 Area as part of the study by Lee et al (Lee et al., 2002) found no evidence of an  
12 association between family income and measured EMF exposure. However, there  
13 was a weak association between low SES and wire code (Hristova et al., 1997). In  
14 a geographic information system (GIS) study as part of the power grid policy project,  
15 English et al. (<http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf/pdf/AppendixG-GIS.PDF>) examined  
16 the ethnic and income characteristics of census blocks within 500 feet of  
17 transmission lines. The proportion of black and Hispanic residents in these corridors  
18 was lower than the state average proportion. Zafanella (Zaffanella & Hooper, 2000)  
19 found somewhat higher magnetic fields in schools of lower socioeconomic status. In  
20 summary, the evidence to support the contention that the EMF exposure, if real,  
21 disproportionately affects low SES subjects is not very strong, but there is some  
22 suggestive data that decision-makers may consider when evaluating policy options.

### 21.6 THE EMF MIXTURE

23 A variety of electrical phenomena are present in the vicinity of power lines, in-home  
24 wiring, plumbing, and appliances. These include EMFs with a variety of frequencies  
25 and orientations, stray currents from contact with grounded plumbing, and air  
26 pollution particles charged by electric fields. The epidemiological studies primarily  
27 implicate the magnetic fields or something closely correlated with them. Some  
28 researchers think that associated high- or low- frequency stray contact currents or  
29 charged air pollution particles are the true explanation rather than magnetic fields.  
30 The actions one would take to eliminate the fields are not always the same as one  
31 would take to eliminate the currents or the charged particles. There are some  
32 situations where different costly measures would be required to address the above-  
33 mentioned three possible explanations. There are other situations where one or

34 more inexpensive avoidance actions will address all three. This additional  
35 uncertainty about what aspect of the mixture might need to be mitigated will thus  
36 provide a challenge for policymakers. The California EMF program funded policy  
37 projects to explore options that could be pursued in the face of these uncertainties  
38 (see [www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf)). These are available to guide CPUC and other state  
39 agencies in policy formation. DHS is making no recommendations at this time.

### 21.7 POLICY RELEVANT AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

40 One of the major impediments to evaluating the potential bioactivity of a complex  
41 mixture is identifying the bioactive components of that mixture. This usually requires  
42 finding some kind of bioassay with which to assess the mixture and then successive  
43 fractions of it. While some epidemiologists have attempted to evaluate the effects of  
44 different aspects of the EMF mixture and some exposure analysts have attempted  
45 to characterize the occurrence and intercorrelation of its aspects, important policy-  
46 relevant questions still remain.

47 Experimentalists have rarely used the mixture as it occurs in real life and have  
48 focused instead on one or the other aspect of the mixture, usually pure sinusoidal  
49 60 Hz fields at intensities far above those found in residential or blue collar  
50 occupational environments. Deeply ingrained experimental research styles and an  
51 orientation to explaining mechanisms rather than describing phenomena has meant  
52 that investigator-initiated research and even programs which attempted to guide  
53 research have rarely been characterized by progressively refined descriptions of  
54 dose response relationships to produce stronger bioeffects.

55 This has been compounded by the expectation of a quick resolution of the question  
56 by those who fund research, as was the case with the New York State program of  
57 the mid-1980s, the current California Program, and the recent five year federal  
58 EMF-RAPID program. As was discovered after President Nixon's "War on Cancer"  
59 in the early 1970s, research progresses slowly and in successive multi-year  
60 research cycles, with the results of each cycle governing the direction of the next. It  
61 would not be surprising if it took four more five-year research cycles to clarify the  
62 EMF issue.

63 This means that if one were serious about clarifying this issue there would need to  
64 be a long-term commitment to steady research funding and funding for intermittent  
65 assessments of the state of the science and research directions. Most research  
66 peer review groups would favor research where a clear bioeffect was present and  
67 credible alternative mechanisms were being explored. Those situations tend to have  
68 a high yield of early definitive results, and such results lead to continued research

1 funding, publications, and research career advancement. The EMF area does not fit  
2 this description, and from this perspective would receive a low priority for funding  
3 from the usual peer review study sections. Indeed, prominent researchers who  
4 doubt that there are any bioeffects, much less epidemiological effects, from the  
5 residential and occupational EMF mixture, feel there is nothing to find and have  
6 recommended that no more funding for this area be provided (Park, 1992).

7 Clearly the three DHS reviewers disagree with the assessment of the evidence to  
8 date and see a number of research areas which are worth pursuing that could  
9 influence and focus exposure avoidance strategies, if any. The cost effectiveness of  
10 further research has been a topic of the program's policy analysis and will be  
11 discussed at greater length in our policy integration document. The cost/benefit  
12 analysis of EMF research suggests that there is so much at stake in choosing  
13 between "expensive," "inexpensive," and "no mitigation," that more research funding  
14 can be easily justified. ([http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf/pdf/Chapter09-  
15 ValueofInformation.pdf](http://www.dhs.ca.gov/ehib/emf/pdf/Chapter09-ValueofInformation.pdf))

16 The highest initial priorities for the reviewers would be to carry out exposure studies  
17 in residential settings and the workplace to see if purported aspects of the EMF  
18 mixture that would require different mitigation strategies are correlated with  
19 magnetic field exposure and could therefore explain their apparent effect. Such  
20 aspects include sudden exposures to the 60 Hz fields, such as micro-shocks, stray  
21 ground currents, and charged air pollutants. Such exposure studies would make it  
22 possible to reanalyze some of the existing worker cohorts to determine if these  
23 aspects are associated with diseases.

24 Rather than further pursuing new studies of rare diseases with long incubation  
25 periods, further studies of the more common conditions in which EMFs might have  
26 shorter induction periods, such as spontaneous abortion, acute myocardial  
27 infarction, and suicide should be given priority. These would be more relevant to a  
28 utilitarian policymaker.

29 On the experimental front, the reviewers suggest giving priority to finding reliable  
30 bioeffects below 100 mG and to carefully exploring dose response relationships and  
31 then mechanisms. The balance between investigator-initiated and programmed  
32 research, as well as the guidelines that will be used for interpreting results, need to  
33 be carefully considered.